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Abstract
In this paper, we propose a theoretical model in which a banking crisis (or bank
distress) causes declines in the aggregate productivity. When borrowing ﬁrms need
additional bank loans to continue their businesses, a high probability of bank failure
discourages ex ante investments (i.e., “specialization”) by the ﬁrms that enhance
their productivity. In a general equilibrium setting, we also show that there may be
multiple equilibria, in one of which bank distress continues and the borrowers’ pro-
ductivity is low, and in the other equilibrium, banks are healthy and the borrowers’
productivity is high. We show that the bank capital requirement may be eﬀective to
eliminate the bad equilibrium and may lead the economy to the good equilibrium in
which the productivity of borrowing ﬁrms and the aggregate output are both high
and the probability of bank failure is low.
1I n t r o d u c t i o n
The historical episodes of banking crises apparently showed that the bank distress causes
deterioration of economic activities in the (very) short-run mainly due to liquidity short-
age. There may exists an additional eﬀect of bank failures that changes the economic
structure possibly in the long-run, and deters economic growth. This paper examines
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1the causes and consequences of bank failure and check how bank failures aﬀect produc-
tivity growth. During the International Great Depression in the 1930s, many countries
experienced banking crises and productivity declines. Cole, Ohanian and Leung (2005)
examined data of 17 countries during the 1930s, and pointed out that there may be
causal relationship between banking crises (or bank distress) and declines in the aggre-
gate productivity. In the 1990s, the Japanese economy has experienced the decade-long
bank distress and slowdown in the productivity growth. The bank distress seemed to
cause a persistent deterioration of the economy as a whole, though a well-functioning
ﬁnancial market had been developed in Japan.1. What is the main mechanism which
generates such relationship?
The main purpose of this paper is to reexamine the mechanism of banking panics
and to show how the failures or panics aﬀect productivity. We will show here that the
eﬀort choices among borrowing ﬁrms may aﬀect the banking panics. In other words, a
coordination failure among borrowers is a trigger for banking panics and productivity
declines.
There are many papers which examine bank failures and panics. The causes of these
crises have been debated. Some paper have shown the depositors’ panics are the main
factors for the crises2 and some papers have shown that external shocks generate bank
failures. Diamond and Rajan (2005) have focused on the external shocks on borrowing
ﬁrms. They have shown that those shocks generate the liquidity shortages and introduce
banking panics. Although those papers implicitly assumed that banking panics aﬀect
the economic conditions or macro performances, they have not examined the relation
between the banking panics and productivity explicitly3. Hence it is not so clear how
bank failures aﬀect economic conditions. Even though there was a bank run, for example,
1For example, see Hayashi and Prescott [2002]
2The seminal paper is Diamond and Dybvig(1983).For example, Allen nad Gale(2000), Bhattacharya
and Gale(1987) are related papers.
3Levine and Zervos (1998) have shown that banks and stock market provide diﬀerent services and
both of them contribute to economic growth. From this result we can infer that bank failures deter
economic growth.They did not examine, however, this possibility explicitly.
2new banks might be able to oﬀer alternative ﬁnancial services.
In this paper, we are going to show another mechanism which generates bank panics.
This paper focuses on the behaviors of borrowing ﬁrms. In this sense, this paper is related
to Diamond and Rajan (2005). Crucial diﬀerence between this paper and Diamond
and Rajan (2005) is that this paper assumes the productivity conditions of ﬁrms are
endogenously determined, although Diamond and Rajan (2005) have assumed there are
exogenous random variables in the borrowing sector. By treating them endogenous, it
becomes possible to get the following important insights. First, we can derive another
reason of banking panics. This paper stresses the coordination failure of borrowers. Of
course, we do not deny the reasons those previous papers have explored. We will show
there is another possibility. It might seem strange that borrowers aﬀect the condition
of a bank since they have already borrowed from the bank. If the borrowing ﬁrms may
require additional investments or liquidities, however, it becomes natural that conditions
of other borrowing ﬁrms aﬀect the balance sheet of the lending bank and the incentive
of a borrowing ﬁrm. We will stress this relation in this paper. Second, it becomes easier
to explain the relation between banking panics and economic productivity. Since the
productivity of each ﬁrm becomes endogenous, we can examine the productivity and
bank panic directly. The possibility of bank failure decreases the incentive of borrowing
ﬁrms and decreases the productivity of borrowing ﬁrms.
To explain these points, we use a theoretical model in which bank distress causes
a decline in the productivity of the borrowing ﬁrms, even though there exists a well-
functioning ﬁnancial market. The model is a modiﬁed version of the models of Diamond
and Rajan(2005) and Holmstrom and Tirole (1998). We assume that a ﬁrm can enhance
its own productivity by costly investment, which may be interpreted as investment in
eﬀort for specialization. (Thus we call this ex ante investment or eﬀort choice “specializa-
tion.”) The ﬁrm needs to borrow from a bank to start the business, and it also needs an
additional investment to continue its business if the ﬁr mi sh i tb yas h o c ka tt h ei n t e r i m
period. From the aspect of speciﬁc skill as explored by Diamond and Rajan(2001, 2005),
we assume the return of the project is not perfectly veriﬁable and seizable to lenders.
3Hence, as in Holmstrom and Tirole’s model, the ﬁrms cannot borrow additional fund in
the ﬁnancial market when the incumbent banks fail.
In this setting, if there is a positive probability of bank failures, a borrowing ﬁrm
cannot get the necessary additional loan and must shut down its business with the pos-
itive probability. Hence a high probability of bank failure is expected, a ﬁrm expects
high probability of shut down and low expected return on the specialization. Since we
assume the specialization by individual ﬁrms enhances its productivity, a lower special-
ization leads to a lower level of productivity. In other words, we can show that a banking
crisis leads to the less specialization of the borrowing ﬁrms, and the decline of aggregate
productivity.
Next we embed this partial equilibrium model into a general equilibrium setting, in
which consumers, as depositors and bank shareholders, provide funds to ﬁrms through
banks. Modeling the general equilibrium economy, we endogenize the probability of
bank failure, and show that the economy may end up with two steady state equilibria:
A good equilibrium and a bad equilibrium. The key point is the following externality
eﬀect among borrowers. The less specialization does not only decrease its productivity
but also increases the probability of bank failure. This means the level of specialization
has the externality eﬀect to the other borrowing ﬁrms through the change of the bank
failure probability. Moreover, if those low productivities are anticipated by depositors,
they will demand resources immediately and generate bank runs as stressed by Diamond
and Rajan (2005). Hence, in the good equilibrium, ﬁrms choose the highest level of spe-
cialization which generates the high aggregate productivity and low probability of bank
failure. In the bad equilibrium, however, ﬁrms choose the lowest level of specialization,
the aggregate productivity is low, and the probability of bank failure is high.
In this general equilibrium model, we conduct numerical experiments in which we
impose capital requirement for banks. The capital requirement policy has an eﬀect, which
eliminates the bad equilibrium for a certain range of parameter values. Therefore, the
capital requirement policy may have an impact that increases the aggregate productivity
of the economy and lowers the probability of banking crisis, through enhancing the
4specialization by ﬁrms. Our result implies that the bank capital requirement may have a
signiﬁcant impact on the social welfare as a whole by aﬀecting the aggregate productivity,
while the existing literature on this topic tend to stress the moral hazard or adverse
selection problems in the banking sector (see, for example, Morrison and White, 2005).
The organization of this paper is as follows. In Section 2, we present a simple example
to show our propositions intuitively and we construct the partial equilibrium version of
our model in Section 3. In Section 4, we embed the partial equilibrium model in the
general equilibrium in which bank failure possibility is endogeously determined. We
describe the model with and without the bank capital requirements. In Section 5, we
demonstrate numerical examples of the general equilibrium model. Section 6 provides
concluding remarks.
2S i m p l i ﬁed Example
To clarify the basic structure of our model, we demonstrate a simpliﬁed model in this
section. There are N ﬁrms which have a potential investment opportunity. This invest-
met requires 1 input at date 1 and will generate R>1a td a t e3 .O n l yfRis seizable for
banks, however, since R is not perfectly veriﬁable. In other words, (1−f)R becomes the
beneﬁt of each ﬁrm under any type of contracts. This investment opportunity may re-
quire additional investments by an idiosyncratic and independent shock at date 2. With
probability q, the additional investment ρ becomes necessary. For simplicity, we assume
that the ﬁrm generates 0 at date 3 if this additional investment was not implemented.
The market interest rate is supposed to be zero for simplicity.
One crucial assumption is that R is dependent upon the eﬀort level, s, of each ﬁrm.
Each ﬁrm can choose sH or sL and the private cost for choosing sH (sL)i sC (0).
Naturally R(sH) is higher than R(sL). T h ee ﬀort level is observable and is chosen
at date 1 before the loan contract is made. Since all ﬁrms choose their eﬀort levels
simultaneously, they cannot coordinate their choice over sH or sL:T h u s t h e r e i s a
5possibility of coordination failure. It is assumed that
fR(sH) > 1+qρ.
In other words, this lending is proﬁtable for a bank as long as the ﬁrm chooses sH,e v e n
though it can seize only fR(sH) and it has to pay the additional investment cost ρ.H e r e
we assume, however,
fR(sH) < ρ.
In this setting, as explored by Holmstrom and Tirole(1998), it is diﬃcult to get ρ in the
market after the shock at date 2. But a bank can oﬀe rac r e d i tl i n ec o n t r a c ta td a t e1
which guarantees to supply ρ when the additional investment is necessary.
Moreover, as long as there is no bank failure and
(1 − f)R(sH) − C>(1 − f)R(sL),
each ﬁrm has an incentive to choose sH. Hence it is a Nash equilibrium that all ﬁrms
choose sH.
If the eﬀort choice aﬀe c t sap o s s i b i l i t yo fb a n kf a i l u r e ,h o w e v e r ,t h e r em a ye x i s t
another equilibrium. Suppose that a bank will fail at date 2 with probability νc and
this probability is a decreasing function of the eﬀort level of the borrowing ﬁrms. When
all ﬁrms choose sH, νc becomes 0, but it becomes very high when all ﬁrms choose sL.
If a bank has failed at date 2, the borrowing ﬁrm cannot get ρ after the shock and R
becomes 0 even though the ﬁrm has chosen sH. In this situation, νc becomes high and
it may becomes very diﬃcult to get ρ if N −1 ﬁrms have chosen sL. Hence another ﬁrm
cannot have an incentive to choose sH. More rigorously, if
{1 − qνc(sH
i ,s L
−i)}(1 − f)R(sH) − C<{1 − qνc(sL
i ,s L
−i)}(1 − f)R(sL),
there is another equilibrium in which all ﬁrms choose sL where νc(sH
i ,s L
−i) is the prob-
ability of bank failure when ﬁrm i chooses sH and the other ﬁrms choose sL. In other
words there are multiple equilibria.
This result is intuitive explanation of our propositions. From the next section, we
formulate a more rigorous model to examine this intuition.
63 Partial equilibrium model: Exogenous probability of bank
run
In this section, we consider a partial equilibrium model in which the probability of
bank run is exogenously given. In the next section, we embed this model in a general
equilibrium economy in which consumers provide funds to ﬁrms through banks and the
probability of bank run is endogenously determined.
The economy is a simpliﬁed version of Holmstrom and Tirole’s (1998) model, in which
there are continua of banks and ﬁrms. Measures of ﬁrms and banks are normalized to one.
The economy continues only one period, and agents can choose their actions two times:
at the beginning of the period and at the middle of the period. Following Holmstrom
and Tirole (1998), we assume that banks have all the bargaining power over ﬁrms, and
they maximize the expected return on the loans to ﬁrms, making ﬁrms break-even.
3.1 Firm
Firms are indexed by i,w h e r ei ∈ [0,1]. At the beginning of the period, ﬁrm i chooses
its level of specialization, si,w h e r esi ∈ [0,1]. We assume that si is observable. Special-
ization incurs private cost ξsi for the ﬁrm. After si is chosen, ﬁrm i borrows Xi units
of consumer goods from a bank, and invest Xi in its production project. At the middle
of the period, a macro shock ν ∈ [ν,1] and an idiosyncratic shock ρi ∈ {0,ρ} hit the
economy. ρi = 0 with probability 1 − q,a n dρi = ρ > 0 with probability q.T h em a c r o
shock ν indicates the success probability of a ﬁrm’s project (see equations (1) and (2)
below). If ρi = ρ, ﬁrm i needs to invest additional fund ρXi at the middle of the period
in order to continue the project. Otherwise, the project must be shut down leaving the
liquidation value, (1 − δ)Xi.I fﬁrm i successfully ﬁnance ρXi or ρi =0 ,i tc a nc o n t i n u e
the project.
In order to consider the situation in which the return of the project is not perfectly
seizable to investors, we consider the following moral hazard situation. After ﬁrm i
chooses to continue the project, the ﬁrm faces an opportunity to shirk. If the ﬁrm shirks,





(r + si)Xi, with prob. ν − ν,
(1 − δ)Xi, with prob. 1 − ν + ν,
(1)
where r>1. If the ﬁrm does not shirk and works diligently, it does not obtain private





(r + si)Xi, with prob. ν,
(1 − δ)Xi, with prob. 1 − ν.
(2)
Therefore, if a ﬁrm shirks, the success probability of its project is lowered by ν.T h e
private beneﬁt for the ﬁrm of shirking, b(si) may be increasing in the level of specializa-
tion, si. Note that the specialization directly increases the output. Thus the average of






i + c0si, (3)
where b0 ≥ 0a n dc0 > 0. In order to give the incentive to no-shirking, lenders have to
abandon a part of the output as will be explained bellow.
3.2 Bank failure and debt contract
We assume that if ν ≤ νc, the bank run occurs and all banks are shut down, where νc
is an exogenous parameter in this section. (The bank run is endogenized in the general
equilibrium setting in Section 4.)





[ν {r + si − Rf(i)} +( 1− ν)(1 − δ)]df (ν) − 1 − qρ, (4)
subject to
νRf(i) ≥ b(si), (5)
where f(ν) is the p.d.f. for ν and Rf(i)i st h eﬁnal payment to ﬁrm i. Rf(i)m u s tb e
determined such that ﬁrm i gets better expected payment when it works diligently than








i + csi, (6)
where b = b0/ν and c = c0/ν.
3.3 Firm’s problem
Anticipating Rf in (6), ﬁrm i chooses si before it borrows from a bank. We assume that
the loan contract between the bank and the ﬁrm survives even if the bank fails: The ﬁrm
must repay retaining Rf in its hand as long as output is produced; and if ﬁrm i is hit
by the idiosyncratic shock ρi after the bank failed, the ﬁrm cannot obtain the necessary
fund for the additional investment and its output becomes (1 − δ)Xi, all of which is to
be repaid to the creditor. (When the bank failed, the creditor of the loan contract is a
















i + csi)df (ν) − ξsi. (7)
We assume that
(r + s −
b
2
s2 − cs)νc +( 1− νc)(1 − δ) < ρ, for all s ∈ [0,1]. (8)
This assumption ensures that a ﬁrm cannot ﬁnance ρ in the ﬁnancial market when the
bank fails. We also assume that
E(ν)
µ





+( 1− E(ν))(1 − δ) > 1+qρ, for all s ∈ [0,1]. (9)
This assumption ensures that a bank will commit to providing credit line of ρ before ν is
revealed in case of the liquidity shock. In the case where ν follows a uniform distribution,
i.e., f(ν)= 1













The derivative of the objective function in (10) with respect to si is
1 − qν2
c − (1 − q)ν2
2(1 − ν)
[bsi + c] − ξ. (11)
Obviously, if νc, the probability of bank failure, is large, the equilibrium value of si may
be 0, the lower bound, and that if νc is small, si may be 1, the upper bound.
93.4 Implication of the model
This partial equilibrium model implies that bank distress, i.e., a large νc,m a yl o w e rt h e
level of specialization of the borrowing ﬁrms and therefore may lead to a lower level of
the aggregate productivity of the economy. A higher probability of bank failure implies
a higher probability that the borrowing ﬁrm fails to continue the business, since the ﬁrm
cannot obtain additional funds if the bank fails. Therefore, the expected return on the
ex ante specialization for the ﬁrm becomes lower if νc is higher, and it chooses the lowest
level of the specialization. Since the specialization enhances productivity, a bank distress
causes the productivity declines in our model. In this sense, our theory seems successful
in explaining productivity declines observed during banking crises, such as the episodes
of the US Great Depression (see Cole and Ohanian [1999] and Ohanian [2001]) and the
lost decade in Japan in the 1990s (see Hayashi and Prescott [2002]). Our model may be
regarded as one explanation for the conjecture by Cole, Ohanian, and Leung (2005) that
the banking crises may have some causal linkage with the productivity declines in the
International Great Depression.
4 General equilibrium model
We can embed the model of the previous section in the general equilibrium setting and
endogenously determine the probability of bank failure, νc. The summary of the structure
of the model is as follows: The ﬁrms choose the degree of specialization, s, taking νc as
given; the banks choose νc, taking s and the market rate of interest, R,a sg i v e n ;a n dR
is determined as an outcome of the general equilibrium. Therefore, the equilibrium of
this model can be regarded as a Nash equilibrium in a simultaneous game in which ﬁrms
choose s and banks choose νc, taking the other players’ actions and R as given. (Although
we used a term of “simultaneous” game, timing of the game is that banks choose νc after
s is chosen by ﬁrms. Our theoretical and numerical results in this paper do not change
even if the banks are the Stackelberg leader, i.e., if the banks can precommit to νc before
ﬁrms choose s, taking the best response of the ﬁrms into account, See footnote 6.) Similar
10to the previous section, we assume that the economy continues only one period. There
are continua of consumers, ﬁrms, and bank-managers, whose measures are normalized to
one. A consumer is given E units of the consumer goods as endowment at the beginning
of the period. Consumers can either invest the endowment in bank capital, C, or put it
into the banks as deposits, D:
C + D ≤ E. (12)
The relationship among bank-managers, bank-capital (consumers), and depositors (con-
sumers) is similar to that in Diamond and Rajan’s (2000) model. A bank-manager has
relation-speciﬁc technology to collect on loans from ﬁrms, but he can threaten the bank-
capital and the depositors that he will walk away without collecting the loans unless he is
paid more (the hold-up problem). To prevent the hold-up problem by the bank-managers,
the bank-capital and the depositors set the deposit contract as the demandable deposit.
Therefore, the depositors can withdraw their deposit at any time they like during the
period. Since bank deposit is demandable, depositors run on banks if the bank-manager
threaten the depositors by oﬀering a renegotiation to lessen the payoﬀ of the depositors,
and the bank run destroys the bank-manager’s surplus. Anticipating this result, the
bank-manager cannot invoke renegotiation under demandable deposit. To make bank
deposit demandable is the optimal design to ensure that the rate of return to bank de-
posit is high and to increase the funds deposited in banks. (In the equilibrium, bank
runs may not occur.)
This contractual arrangement may have a side-eﬀect when a macro shock ν is intro-
duced in the economy: Under demandable deposit contracts, bank runs occur when the
macro shock ν is less than a certain threshold value, νc. The feature that a macro shock
triggers a bank run is the same as Allen and Gale’s (1998) optimal ﬁnanical crisis model.
Bank runs: We assume the following for the payoﬀs of the agents in the event of bank
run. When the bank run occurs, the ownership of bank assets is transferred to the groups
of depositors. Thus, the bank capital obtains zero. A borrowing ﬁrm produces (r+si)Xi
if it is not hit by the idiosyncratic shock ρ, while it can produce (1 − δ)Xi if it is hit
11by the shock ρ, since it cannot obtain the additional investment which is necessary to
continue production. Therefore, a ﬁrm gets Rf(i) with probability (1−q) and zero with
probability q. We assume that the depositors get (1 − δ)X + qρX + L,w h i c hi st h e
sum of the liquidation value of bank lending, (1 − δ)X, the remaining liquid asset, L,
and qρX,w h i c hw a sk e p tf o rl e n d i n gt ot h eﬁrms who will be hit by the shock ρ.H e r e
we implicitly assumed that a ﬁrm’s output that exceeds (1 − δ)Xi is simply vanished
as a dead weight loss due to the resource-consuming negotiations among depositors (or
rent-seeking activities). This inability of depositors is consistent with the assumption
that only the bank-managers have relation-speciﬁc technology to collect the full value of
the bank loans.
4.1 Bank-capital’s problem
A bank-capital, i.e., a coalition of consumers who invest C i n t oab a n k ,t a k e st h em a r k e t
rate of interest, R, and the level of the borrower’s specialization, si,a sg i v e n . T h e
bank-capital chooses the deposit, D, that they borrow, the investment in a safe asset,
L, the investment in the (risky) ﬁrms, X, the deposit rate, Rd,t h er a t eo fﬁnal payment
to ﬁrm i, Rf(i), and the threshold value of the macro shock that triggers a bank run,
νc. Safe asset L is just storage of the consumer goods. Thus one unit of L can be
converted to one unit of consumer goods at any time. X is the loan to ﬁrms, which
is invested in the production projects by the borrowers. We assume that a bank lends
to inﬁnitely many ﬁrms so that the idiosyncratic risk, ρi is perfectly diversiﬁed for the
bank. Therefore, a bank that lends X to ﬁrms must lend qρX additionally to the ﬁrms
at the interim period when the idiosyncratic liquidity shocks are revealed. (We assume
that (9) is satisﬁed, that is the commit to the credit line ρX is ex ante optimal for a
bank.) A bank run occurs if ν < νc.I f ν = νc, it must be the case that depositors
are indiﬀerent whether to run on the bank or not to run. This condition is equivalent
to RdD =[ νc{r + si − Rf(i)} +( 1− νc)(1 − δ)]X + L. Finally, we assume that the
bank-capital can obtain only the fraction θ (< 1) of the total surplus without the help
of the bank-manager who has the relation-speciﬁc technology of collecting loans. This
12assumption implies that the total surplus of the bank is divided by a bargaining such
that θ goes to the bank-capital and 1 − θ to the bank-manager.






([ν{r + si − Rf(i)} +( 1− ν)(1 − δ)]X + L − RdD)f(ν)dν, (13)
subject to
D + C = L +( 1+qρ)X, (14)
{(1 − δ)X + qρX + L}·Prob(ν < νc)+RdD · Prob(ν ≥ νc) ≥ RD, (15)
RdD =[ νc{r + si − Rf(i)} +( 1− νc)(1 − δ)]X + L, (16)
νRf(i) ≥ b(si), (17)
where (14) is the balance-sheet identity for the bank, and (15) is the participation con-





i + csi. (18)
4.2 Solution to the bank’s problem
We focus on the case where the macro shock, ν, follows the uniform distribution over
[ν,1], i.e., f(ν)= 1
1−ν.W ed e ﬁne s as the average level of specialization of the borrowers
of the bank. We focus on the symmetric equilibrium in which all ﬁrms choose the same
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b
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r + s −
b
2
s2 − cs − (1 − δ)
¸
. (21)
13We assume and justify later that g(νc,R) ≥ 0a n dR>1. Then we get the solution:






r + s − b
2s2 − cs + qρ − (1 − δ) − 2(1 − ν)(1 + qρ)R +2 ( 1− ν)(1 − δ) − 2νqρ
r + s − b
2s2 − cs − qρ − (1 − δ)
.(24)
4.3 General equilibrium
In the general equilibrium, the arbitrage condition between the return rate of bank capital





r + s −
b
2
s2 − cs − (1 − δ)
¸
X = RC, (25)
where X = RC
g(νc,R). This condition determines R (for given s). Finally, given R(s)b y
(25) and νc(s) by (24), ﬁrm’s problem (10) determines the value of s in the general
equilibrium. Note that ﬁrm i chooses si to solve (10), taking νc(s)a sg i v e n ,w h e r es
is the average level of specialization for the borrowers of the bank. Since the objective
function of ﬁrms is quadratic, the solution must be a corner solution: si =1i fνc(s)i s
small and si =0i fνc(s) is large. Therefore, either s =1o rs = 0 in the equilibrium.4
Note that s and νc can be regarded as the outcome of a simultaneous game between ﬁrms
and banks: Firms choose s, taking νc as given; and banks choose νc, taking s and R as
given. In Section 5 we will show numerical examples.
4.4 A model with the bank capital requirements
In this subsection, we consider the economy where a capital requirement is imposed by
the government. The capital requirments have become a major part of the banking
regulation recently. We will show in the numerical experiments in Section 5 that the
capital requirements may be eﬀe c t i v et oi m p r o v es o c i a lw e l f a r eb ye l i m i n a t i n gt h eb a d
equilibrium or by leading the economy to the good equilibrium.
The banks in this economy are subject to the following constraint: X ≤ λC.
4The equilibrium values of bank capital,C, and bank deposit, D, are deteremined by C + D = E =
L + X, (22), and (23).


















X ≤ λC, (27)
−g(νc)X − (R − 1)L + RC ≥ 0. (28)
We deﬁne ˜ R and g(˜ νc) as the solutions in the case where there is no capital requirements,





X = λC should hold in the equilibrium. We assume λC<
˜ RC


























Solving (32) gives us νc(R,s).









s − c)s − (1 − δ)
¸
λ = R. (33)
This condition gives R(s). Given R(s)a n dνc(R,s), the ﬁrst-order condition for the
ﬁrm’s problem, (11), gives the equilibrium value of s. There may be unique equilibrium
or multiple equilibria, depending on the parameter values.
5In our numerical examples in Section 5, we checked that this assumption holds.
155 Numerical example
In this section, we show some numerical examples.
5.1 From multiple equilibria to good equilibrium
In the ﬁrst example, there are multiple equilibria (s = 0 and s = 1) if the bank capital
requirement is not imposed; and imposition of the capital requirement can eliminate the
bad equilibrium in which s = 0, and the good equilibrium in which s =1b e c o m e st h e
unique equilibrium.
We employ the values of parameters as in Table 1. In this case, the equilibrium of
r δ C θ ¯ s ξρ νbcqλ
5. 52. 51. 3 23. 3. 1. 5. 31 . 5
Table 1: Parameter Values (1)
the basic model in which no capital requirement is imposed is as in Table 2. There are
multiple equilibria. We ﬁnd that these two equilibria are stable.6
sR νc C/X
0 1.4586 .4667 .3134
1 1.5673 .4545 .3356
Table 2: Result (1) - Without Capital Requirement
However, if we introduce the bank capital requirement, there is unique equilibrium with
s =¯ s = 1 as in Table 3. This unique equilibrium is also stable. Therefore, we can make
6 We checked whether the banks’ payoﬀ can be improved if the banks choose νc(ˆ s)a n dt h eﬁrms choose
ˆ s,w h e r eˆ s =1− s
∗ and s
∗ (= 0 or 1) is the value in the equilibrium, while the market rate of interest is
ﬁxed at the equilibrium value, R
∗. If there is such a possibility and the banks are the Stackelberg leader,
the banks have an incentive to deviate from the equilibrium, and therefore the equilibrium is unstable.
(Note that banks want to deviate, taking R = R
∗ as given, while R will change from R
∗ if they actually
deviate.) If there is no such ˆ s that improves the banks’ payoﬀs, we call the equilibrium stable.
16sR νc C/X
1 1.2994 .3000 .6667
Table 3: Result (1) - With Capital Requirement
the good equilibrium the unique equilibrium using the capital requirement. The reason
why the capital requirement is eﬀective to eliminate the bad equilibrium is simply that
a bank with more capital is less susceptible to a bank run: Suppose that X and L are
ﬁxed and that C increases, i.e., D decreases; condition (16) implies that νc decreases in
this case; and therefore, the derivative of the objective function of the ﬁrm’s problem,
(11), implies that the equilibrium value of s is more likely to be one, the upper bound.
5.2 From bad equilibrium to multiple equilibria
In the second example, there exists only the bad equilibrium in which s =0i ft h e
bank capital requirement is not imposed; and imposition of the capital requirement can
generate the good equilibrium in which s = 1, and there become multiple equilibria.
We employ the values of parameters as in Table 4. In this case, the equilibrium of the
r δ C θ ¯ s ξρ νbcqλ
5. 52. 51. 4 63. 2. 3. 5. 31 . 5
Table 4: Parameter Values (2)
basic model in which the capital requirement is not imposed is as in Table 5. There is
a unique equilibrium in which s =0 . W eﬁnd that this equilibrium is stable. However,
sR νc C/X
0 1.3684 .4667 .2923
Table 5: Result (2) - Without Capital Requirement
if we introduce the capital requirement, there are multiple equilibria as in Table 6. The
17good equilibrium with s = 1 is stable, while the bad equilibrium with s = 0 is unstable.7
sR νc C/X
0 1.2475 .2315 .6667
1 1.3258 .2364 .6667
Table 6: Result (2) - With Capital Requirement
Therefore, we can say that introducing the capital requirement gives us a chance that
we can shift the economy to the good equilibrium from the bad one.
5.3 A case where capital requirements do not matter
In the previous two examples, introduction of the capital requirement has a good eﬀect
to increase the productivity and output in the economy, since the policy makes (a chance
of) realization of the good equilibrium. However, if we employ the following values of
paramters as in Table 7, the capital requirement does not change the equilibrium values
of specialization: There are multiple equilibria both in the cases with and without the
capital requirement.
r δ C θ ¯ s ξρ νbcqλ
5. 52. 51. 2 43. 3. 3. 1. 31 . 5
Table 7: Parameter Values (3)
For these parameter values, the equilibria of the basic model in which the capital
requirement is not introduced are as in Table 8. There are multiple equilibria. We ﬁnd
that these equilibria are stable. Even if we introduce the capital requirement, there are
also multiple equilibria as in Table 9. Only the good equilibrium with s = 1 is stable
in this case. Therefore, if the banks move taking the ﬁrms actions as given, introducing
7If the banks are the Stackelberg leaters, the good equilibrium is the unique equilibrium in this
economy.
18sR νc C/X
0 1.4586 .4667 .3134
1 1.6402 .4476 .3488
Table 8: Result (3) - Without Capital Requirement
sR νc C/X
0 1.1812 .3000 .6667
1 1.3781 .3000 .6667
Table 9: Result (3) - With Capital Requirement
the capital requirement does not resolve the multiplicity, while if the banks are the
Stackelberg leaders, only the good equilibrium survives in the economy with capital
requirement.
5.4 The bank-induced instability and the capital requirements
Our general equilibrium model has interesting implications. The banks in this economy
provides insurance for the idiosyncratic liquidity shocks to ﬁrms, as those in Holmstrom
and Tirole’s (1998) model. This insurance function enables ﬁrms to undertake production
projects and ex ante specialization, and thus increases the aggregate productivity of the
economy. If the economy is not subject to the macro shock, ν, the existence of banks
leads the economy to the good equilibrium. This is consistent with well known result
i nt h el i t e r a t u r et h a tﬁnancial deepening is relevant to or even crucial for the economic
growth (see Levine [1997]). Our model implies that if there exists the macro shock,
the existence of banks may generate multiple equilibria on the premise that the banks
are subject to bank runs ` a la Diamond and Rajan (2000). In this case, the economy
may become instable and ﬂuctuate between the good and the bad equilibria. Therefore,
the existence of banks is good in that they provide insurance and generate the good
equilibrium, but is not suﬃciently good in that they cannot necessarily eliminate the
19bad equilibrium if the economy is subject to the macro shock, causing a large instability
in the economy.
The possibility of bank runs decreases the expected return on specialization for the
ﬁrms, and thus increases the instability. The capital requirement policy in this model
can be regarded as a complement to the ﬁnancial sector, which eliminates or reduces the
instability of the economy. The capital requirement changes the equilibrium composition
of C and D, so that the bank run is less likely to occur. Therefore, the bank capital
requirement may raise the aggregate productivity through reducing the probability of
bank run, νc, and enhancing the specialization by the ﬁrms.
6C o n c l u s i o n
We introduced the borrowers’ choice of specialization into Holmstrom and Tirole’s (1998)
model, and showed that the specialization is negatively aﬀe c t e db yb a n kd i s t r e s s .Ah i g h
probability of bank failure discourages the borrowers’ specialization ex ante, and lowers
the aggregate productivity of the economy. Our theory seems successful in explaining
productivity declines observed during banking crises, such as the episodes of the Great
Depression in the 1930s and the lost decade in Japan in the 1990s.
The general equilibrium version of our model also provides a potential motive for
the bank capital requirements. The model implies that the bank capital requirements
may be able to lead the economy to the good equilibrium where ﬁrms choose a higher
level of specialization. The bank regulation may be eﬀective to enhance the aggregate
productivity through reducing the bank-induced instability, or eliminating the bad equi-
librium. Multiplicity of equilibria or the bank-induced instability may be important in
explaining large business ﬂuctuations associated with banking crises, especially in the
emerging markets. The eﬀectiveness of the capital requirements in reducing the bank-
induced instability may be worth studying further to deepen our understanding of the
necessity of bank regulations.
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